Can North Korean leader Kim Jong-un be stopped? (2023)

How to stop Kim Jong-un

Last year, North Korean ruler Kim Jong-un accelerated his country's rush to acquire nuclear weapons and ICBMs, leaving President Donald Trump facing a looming crisis. TIME asked six experts how we got here, why the problem is so pressing and so difficult — and what China and the U.S. can do now to solve it

Why we fell short and why it is no longer an option

Wendy Sherman and Evans Revere die

North Korea's isolated dictators have long believed that nuclear weapons would ensure the regime's survival against US military might and enable it to unify the Korean peninsula on its terms. Successive US administrations have tried different strategies to counter the regime's dangerous developments. Some have made progress but have been held back by North Korea's disloyalty, changes in political direction and wary partners and allies in the region who wanted a different approach.

We now know that during much of this time Pyongyang was working to maintain and even expand its nuclear program. North Korea has multiple nuclear weapons and is perfecting the missiles designed to carry them. The North Korean challenge, which President Obama reportedly told then-President Donald Trump, is the most dangerous and difficult security challenge he will face.

The US has tried diplomatic incentives, including normalization of relations, security guarantees, economic and food aid, and confidence-building steps. Nothing has produced lasting results. The US and its partners sought "freezes". Yet North Korea agreed to several freezes on its nuclear weapons program, but still found ways to violate the agreements and, when caught, refused international inspection and verification. The US government has attempted to impose sanctions, but has been confronted by China's unwillingness to enforce those sanctions and an inadequate international response.

During the Clinton administration, a negotiated plan to end North Korea's program, while successful, ultimately proved unsustainable. The US governments considered military action, but then backed off, deeming the risk of a catastrophic war too great.

The main reason we are where we are today is because North Korea has withdrawn from every nuclear disarmament agreement ever made. The regime clearly wants more nuclear weapons than any stimulus. And it has not changed its behavior despite sanctions.

But no US government, working with regional leaders and the international community, has ever used all its tools and resources simultaneously and overwhelmingly to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program and force the regime to choose between nuclear weapons and regime survival.

Forcing Pyongyang to make this drastic decision is the best way forward. A successful American strategy carries risks, but a growing nuclear threat from North Korea and the possibility that a miscalculation could lead to war mean we must do everything we can to quickly meet the challenge of dealing with Pyongyang.

Sherman served as Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 2011 to 2015. Revere served as Executive Director of the Korea Society from 2007 to 2010

Resist the temptation to do nothing

Chris Hill dies

There are undoubtedly problems and even crises in the worldaway alone The North Korean nuclear issue is not one of them. The growing number of tests in recent years, including two nuclear detonations in 2016 alone, suggest that North Korea has made the development, deployment and ability to deliver nuclear weapons a national goal. With its accelerating ICBM program, it has made it clear that it is seeking the ability to strike targets far from the Korean Peninsula, namely the US mainland.

But after decades, the temptation to simply do nothing is great. After all, Pakistan has developed and tested nuclear weapons with little international response. The same was true for India. And Israel. Why can't North Korea do the same? The answer lies in the nature of the North Korean state. North Korea has little interest in being a member of the international community, in having allies, or in collective security. Trade is reduced to a series of negotiations, and international standards of behavior ridiculed.

Some argue that North Korea wants nuclear weapons for regime security, an analysis that suggests North Korea is simply warning predators to stay away or it would happen.

North Korea's contempt for its neighbors even suggests it would hold them hostage with its nuclear weapons. North Korea threatened to turn the South Korean capital into a "sea of ​​fire". Such a threat takes on new significance when a country possesses nuclear weapons.

While South Korea and Japan are protected by their alliances with the United States and their nuclear umbrella, how long would this situation last? If North Korea invaded South Korea (again), would the US come to its aid if North Korea could threaten the US with a nuclear attack? Would the South Korean people believe a certain response from the United States? Would proliferation stop with South Korea and Japan? What about Taiwan? The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would soon crumble and with it the sense of security in the region.

And if North Korea has an operational nuclear weapon capable of reaching the United States within the next four years, would President Trump tell the American people that he weighed the options and decided it was best to do nothing?

A career Foreign Service officer, Hill served as Ambassador to South Korea from 2004 to 2005 and Deputy Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2005 to 2009

The dangers of a preemptive strike

af Gregory F. Treverton

More than one US president has been lured into a pre-emptive strike against North Korea. The upside, however, is that it is unlikely to work for the narrow goal of ending the country's nuclear program, and for the larger goal of decapitating the regime, success may cause more problems than it solves.

Military options against the North's nuclear arsenal have two problems: they may not succeed, and Pyongyang has devastating retaliatory capabilities. The information on the Nordic nuclear program is quite good, but not perfect. From the beginning, the country has hidden important facilities and missilesThe more mobile they are, the harder they are to reach.

Airstrikes on nuclear facilities combined with cyber attacks and maybe commando attacks can do some damage, but since the program is now fully native, it can be fixed soon enough.

And it is hard to imagine Kim Jong-un doing nothing while the US and its allies destroy their nuclear program. Seoul is within artillery range in the north. Kim could retaliate without using nuclear weapons. This would mean that any attack on nuclear facilities must be accompanied by attacks on other facilities that threaten the South. In other words, the war would escalate before Kim retaliated.

The other preemptive options aimed at overthrowing the regime have their own quirks. If Kim was killed, would the regime break up or rally around the family? War games suggest that a dangerous mix of violence, refugees and a race to control these nuclear weapons would ensue. In this stew, the game suggests, allies, let alone China, would be as much of a problem as resistance from the remaining North Korean forces.

From the current perspective, neither diplomacy nor sanctions are likely to thwart the Nordic nuclear program. Therefore, regime change seems increasingly attractive. But better, it comes from within. Given Kim's reckless habits—drinking and driving are two of his favorite pastimes—a self-inflicted biological solution is more than possible. Just as likely, an insider will eventually get so angry that they take him down, not to mention the consequences.

Treverton, former president of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, is a senior advisor to SM&A Corporation

China needs to get serious

Von Victor Cha

For decades, China has played a smoke-and-mirrors game with North Korea, trapping the United States in doomed negotiations that spare Beijing a short-term crisis on its border but ignore the larger problem. China's moves have undermined US goals in three key areas.

First, US economic sanctions against North Korea have proven ineffective as long as China continued to finance the regime through back channels and allow its companies and banks to do business with North Korea. Second, China has long been a free agent in negotiations, with little at stake in terms of short-term success or failure.

In past deals, the US and its allies have compensated Pyongyang with heavy fuel oil and energy subsidies in exchange for a freeze on North Korea's missile tests; China, meanwhile, maintained normal bilateral economic relations with Pyongyang and exempted the country from any direct involvement in the denuclearization project. Third, China has largely ignored the international anti-proliferation financing regime, which aims to punish North Korean companies that pour money into its WMD programs.

China's economic ties to the North should be the lever that forces change, not the reason it never happens. First, Washington must make clear to Beijing that it will not resume talks as long as China insists on keeping at least 80 to 85 percent of North Korea's trade.

Second, the US should make China step in and paydirectly for the denuclearization of North Korea. China's payments in support of Pyongyang should be directly related to nuclear inspections and eventual denuclearization, not to China's economic interests. If China pays for denuclearization, it will take North Korea's violations more seriously than in the past.

Finally, China must crack down on domestic Chinese companies doing business with North Korea. As with human rights abusers, the United States should "name and shame" Chinese nationals — such as the four named by the Justice Department in September 2016 — who conspired to circumvent U.S. economic sanctions and facilitate dollar transactions for a sanctioned company in North Korea. to give. If China takes the threat seriously, it should hand over such things.

Cha served as the Director of Asian Affairs at the National Security Council from 2004-2007 and is now the Director of Asian Studies at Georgetown University

Trump's new wrinkle brings promise and risk

Kurt Campbell dies

For President Donald Trump, there is a long-standing diplomatic truth: North Korea is the land of poor opportunity. That could explain why he and his team have largely followed a predictable pattern, announcing their intention to increase military deterrence with close allies, bolster US defenses in Asia and tighten sanctions against the North Korean regime.

The only news seems to be that the government will try to use force to blame China for North Korea's provocations. Some senior US officials are threatening to severely punish Chinese banks that do business with North Korea, mimicking the kind of economic approaches and international coalitions successfully used against Iran under the Obama administration. As Beijing continues to push for regional talks, the Trump team rightly argues that two decades of multilateral diplomacy have failed to contain the North. They now argue that China must do more to keep Kim Jong-un under control, or at least contained. Along with asking key Europeans to join in as well, an early entry into the Trump Doctrine might well be: now it's up to you.

But Chinese assertiveness, North Korean provocations, Japanese fears and South Korean political unrest are spreading dangerously across Northeast Asia. Normally, the turmoil there would prompt key Asian players to look to the United States for stability.

But Trump's challenge to traditional American leadership in Asia — champion of free trade, supporter of allies and guardian of peace — has further alarmed Asian capitals. Trump's push to get China to do more could initially give Beijing the lead in a battle with Washington over the Korean peninsula.

But a more dominant Chinese role in Korea carries other risks. American leadership is still seen as essential to the stability and prosperity of the entire region, the center of the global economy. This, despite poor options, makes them all look better when the US is deeply caught in the dangerously evolving Korean equation.

Campbell served as Deputy Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific from 2009 to 2013